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The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) can easily be obscured if the eavesdropper can
utilize technical imperfections of the actual implementation. Here we describe and experimentally
demonstrate a very simple but highly effective attack which even does not need to intercept the
quantum channel at all. Only by exploiting the dead time effect of single photon detectors the
eavesdropper is able to gain (asymptotically) full information about the generated keys without
being detected by state-of-the-art QKD protocols. In our experiment, the eavesdropper inferred
up to 98.8% of the key correctly, without increasing the bit error rate between Alice and Bob
significantly. Yet, we find an evenly simple and effective countermeasure to inhibit this and similar
attacks.
The communication of sensitive data has become part of our everyday life resulting in a growing need for mechanisms
which ensure secure transmissions of these data. The secrecy of the information transfer can be guaranteed using a
classical cryptographic method called one-time-pad. This method enables unconditionally secure communication –
provided that the exchange of the cryptographic key has been perfectly secure. In 1984 Ch. Bennett and G. Brassard
showed that this indeed can be achieved using quantum cryptography, or more precisely quantum key distribution
(QKD) [1, 2], an approach which employs non-orthogonal quantum states for encoding information. Over the past
years there have been remarkable QKD experiments pushing both the limits in distance and/or key rate [3–6] as well as
the level of applicability achieving network functionality [7, 8] with first systems for quantum secured communication
being commercially available.
Yet, what does ”secure” mean? Today there exist security proofs [9, 10] showing that the ideal protocol is secure in
the sense that any knowledge of an eavesdropper about the key can be quantified and consequently made negligibly
small. However, these proofs rarely specify requirements for QKD hardware and, if they do, real implementations
will usually not fully comply with these specifications. This can lead to new types of attacks which are not covered
by the proofs and hence won’t be revealed by standard security tests. Recently, considerable effort has been made to
reveal those potential threats [11–15] and to find countermeasures against them [16–22]. Many attacks are designed
only for very specific systems and/or require sophisticated technology which is not yet (public) state-of-the-art.
In this paper we introduce a novel type of attack which even does not need to intercept the qubits sent over the
quantum channel. We show how to utilize an imperfection, which almost all QKD-systems display, namely the fact
that common single photon detectors are rendered inactive for a period of time (called dead time) after a detection
event. This enables the eavesdropper to unveal the full key without significantly changing the quantum bit error ratio
using very simple equipment. On the one hand we demonstrate that this new attack renders a conventional QKD
system absolutely insecure, but, on the other hand, we also provide an effective countermeasure.
There are two characteristic features of nearly all QKD systems implemented so far. The first is the fact that when
a SPAD registers a photon, there usually follows a period of time during which it will not be able to detect a second
event. This period (called dead time τD) can range from less than a nanosecond to some tens of microseconds. The
second feature is the periodic operation: The transmitter emits signals only at well defined times ti = i · T , with
period T . Consequently, in order to reduce noise originating from intermediate dark counts and scattering events, the
receiver accepts a detection event only during a narrow time window (∆tw  T ) around ti – all events outside these
time windows are discarded.
Several attacks have been proposed making use of the dead time of SPADs to enable intercept-resend eavesdropping
strategies [24–26]. Effectively, for these attacks the eavesdropper employs a sophisticated intercept-resend setup and
uses bright light to gain full control over the SPADs of the receiver and to generate detection events equal to his own.
The attack demonstrated here is technically much simpler and neither intercepts the quantum channel nor does it
require bright light to control the receiver or to spy into this system by some Trojan horse attack. Rather, it utilizes
the fact that dead times enable the eavesdropper to manipulate the detection efficiencies for a short time around ti by
blinding some of the installed detectors. Although the eavesdropper does not need to intercept the qubits sent over
the quantum channel, she can reveal the full key without being detected.
For our blinding attack, the eavesdropper (Eve) simply sends attenuated light pulses of one of the four polarizations
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FIG. 1: a) Schematic drawing of the set-up: The transmitter (Alice) on the left, her pulses marked blue, the eavesdropper
(Eve) in the centre, her pulses marked red and the receiver (Bob) on the right. The latter performs a state analysis with four
detectors and passive optical components. The module utilizes a first non-polarizing 50/50 beam splitter (BS), which effectively
serves as a (quantum) random basis switch, such that if the incident photon is reflected and detected behind a polarizing beam
splitter (PBS) it is analyzed in the H/V basis, whereas, if transmitted by the BS and a half-wave plate @ 22.5◦ and detected
behind a second PBS it is analyzed in the ±45◦ basis. In this example, when Eve sent a light pulse polarized in one of the four
polarizations (here: −45◦), up to three of Bob’s detectors (in this example H,−45◦, V , red) become inactive with a certain
probability. Eve thus knows that Alice’s signal pulse can only be detected in the remaining detector (here +45◦) and can infer
the respective key bit. b) Relative efficiency for a second detection event after a detection at t = 0 (see Methods) together with
the timing of Eve’s blinding pulses at tB,i and Alice’s signal pulses at ti. (Pulse and gate widths are not to scale, typically
∼ 1 ns.)
used in the protocol (i.e. H, V, +45◦ or −45◦), into the quantum channel at time tB,i, shortly (less than τD) before
ti and of course still outside of Bob’s time window (∆tw/2 < ti− tB,i < τD). Depending on intensity and polarization
of the pulse, Bob’s SPADs detect this light with a certain probability, except for the SPAD detecting the orthogonal
polarization. Bob then is partially blinded (note, in QKD protocols the events caused by blinding pulses are not taken
into account as they are outside of Bob’s time window) and if he agrees with Alice on using a particular event in the
sifting phase Eve will have significant information about the respective key bit as it could have been detected only
by not blinded detectors. Eve can easily tune the intensity of her blinding pulses and thus the information about
the key. As it turns out, dim pulses containing only a few photons are sufficient to determine almost all the key (see
Methods).
In the following we describe a model QKD device which employs a BB84 protocol [1] with the polarization of single
photons or attenuated light pulses encoding the qubits. The general principle can be easily transferred to nearly all
other QKD-systems [6, 27]. We set up a copy of our free space QKD system [7, 23] in the lab. There, Alice used
a four diode transmitter and was connected by a short free space quantum channel to Bob’s four SPAD receiver
module (Fig. 1a). Both, transmitter and receiver units where fully computer controlled and ran a real-time BB84
protocol. Additionally, Eve coupled dim pulses from a transmitter module, similar to the Alice module, into the
quantum channel. For easier synchronization with Alice and Bob, control signals for the Eve module were obtained
from Alice’s controller.
The timing was set such that Alice’s signal pulses were sent with a period of T = 4 µs (long enough to allow the
SPADs to recover with a high probability between two consecutive signal pulses and to guarantee unbiased detections).
In accordance with the timing conditions of our setup (τD ∼ 2 µs, ∆tw = 5 ns) the randomly polarized blinding pulses
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FIG. 2: Experimental results of the eavesdropping attack (a) showing the probability for detecting blinding pulse photons
in zero, one, two, three or four detectors depending on the effective mean photon number per blinding pulse. (b) shows the
quantum bit error ration (QBER) of Alice’s and Bob’s key and the information about this key gained by Eve. By using different
combinations of neutral density filters, the mean photon number per blinding pulse was changed, while keeping the signal pulse
intensity constant. With increasing number of photons per blinding pulse the probability that three detectors are blinded
increases rapidly resulting in an information of > 0.9 bit for about 17 photons, while the QBER does not increase and leaves
Alice and Bob ignorant about the attack.
were sent 200 ns before the signal pulses. The mean photon number µeffB := ηBµB of the blinding pulses was set
by inserting different combinations of neutral density filters. Here, µeffB constitutes the mean photon number per
pulse Eve would have to send into an ideal detector module (regarding transmission and detector efficiency) built
like depicted in Fig. 1. ηB describes the transmission from Eve to Bob. Uniform, but non-unity transmission and
detector efficiencies can be included here. For receiver modules with active basis switching (two detectors), only half
of the blinding pulse intensity is necessary.
Eve’s key was deduced solely from the knowledge about the setting of her blinding pulses and from eavesdropping
the classical communication between Alice and Bob. To demonstrate the efficiency of this attack, Eve applied different
blinding intensities during regular runs of the BB84 protocol between Alice and Bob. The calculated blinding pulse
detection probabilities (Fig. 2a) are in good agreement with the experimental data particularly for low blinding pulse
intensities µeffB . For higher values of µ
eff
B , the predictions differ mainly because of a higher number of background
events due to increased spontaneous emissions from Eve’s laser diodes between the pulses. These, too, can render the
detectors inactive and thus reduce the probability for multi-photon detection events due to blinding pulses. In our
experiment no hardware gating was used, i.e. the SPADs are in principle always active. Yet, as gate times are device
information we can safely assume that the eavesdropper knows about the timing of the detector efficiency relative to
the signal pulses and will act accordingly.
As expected, for low blinding pulse intensities, Eve’s attack has only a low probability of success and her key is
hardly correlated with the sifted key between Alice and Bob. Yet, by slightly increasing the power of her pulses, the
match between the keys rises rapidly. The maximum observed overlap between Bob’s and Eve’s sifted keys was as
high as 98.83 % at a blinding pulse mean photon number of only µeffB = 16.52, corresponding to a mutual information
IEB = 0.908 Bit (Fig. 2b). Figure 3 visualizes the success of Eve’s attack, who easily recovers the emblem of the
University of Munich from the one-time pad encrypted cipher.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated a powerful and successful attack that threatens many state-of-the-art QKD
systems. By inserting blinding pulses into the quantum channel and eavesdropping on the classical communication
only, an adversary is able to gain almost full information about the sifted key without being detected. The potential
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FIG. 3: Application of the keys obtained in the experiment. Alice uses her sifted key to encrypt the original image with a
one-time pad (top left corner) and sends the ciphertext (top center) to Bob, who uses his error corrected key to decrypt the
image (top right corner). The three images below are decrypted using Eve’s educated guess of the sifted key, for blinding pulses
with a mean photon number of µeffB = 0.83, µ
eff
B = 5.29 and µ
eff
B = 16.52, respectively.
µeffB QBER Alice-Bob / % QBER Bob- Eve / % IEB
0.37 1.10 48.17 0.001
0.49 1.12 47.54 0.002
0.83* 1.09 45.24 0.007
1.88 1.01 38.43 0.039
5.29* 1.11 21.00 0.259
9.75 1.12 6.91 0.638
16.52* 1.25 1.17 0.908
TABLE I: Quantum bit error ratios (QBER) and Eve’s information for the different blinding pulse intensities used in the
experiment. The three datasets marked with a ”*” are the ones used to decrypt the secret message shown in Fig. 3. Note,
there is only a minor change of the QBER between Alice and Bob making it impossible for them to discover the attack. The
sifted key files were each longer than 20 kByte, resulting in a statistical error of the QBER of < 3%.
of this attack is especially high because of its simplicity. The eavesdropper does not need to intercept the quantum
channel and does not need to measure the low light level photonic signals emitted by Alice.
Fortunately, the defence against this blinding attack is as simple. Evidence could be obtained, if Bob analyzes the
detection events not only during the short time windows. However, by cleverly employing (several) blinding pulses at
random times during this interval, Eve would simulate background noise and her attack still could remain unnoticed.
A better strategy would monitor the status of the SPADs. This can be deduced from the bias voltage at the SPADs
such that it is guaranteed that the detection efficiency is at a nominal level. Now, if we use only those detection
events for the key generation where all detectors were active, the blinding attack and all other currently proposed dead
time attacks [24–26] become ineffective. This scheme also avoids possible problems due to saturation effects in ultra
high rate QKD set-ups [28, 29], thereby establishing significant trust in this quantum secure photonic communication
method.
Dead Time Analysis
SPADs exhibit a detection efficiency which depends on the overbias voltage applied. After detection, depending on
the electronics, it takes some time until the detector regains full efficiency. For the characterization of the detector’s
dead time, we illuminated it by two consecutive faint laser pulses. The delay between the first and second pulse has
been varied and the corresponding relative detection efficiency (normalized to the value after 3.5 µs was recorded (see
Fig. 1b). The line is a fit using the function E(t′) = 12
(
1 + erf
(
t′−τD
τ2
))
·
(
1− e− t
′
τ3
)
with t′ time after detection
5and fit parameters τD,τ2 (jitter due to pulse discrimination) and τ3 (charging time of SPAD capacity). For passive
quenching electronics the dead time τD is particularly long (≈ 400 ns), whereas it is about 50 ns when using active
quenching. Nevertheless, the eavesdropping scheme can be applied equally well.
Detection Probabilities
Blinding pulse detection probabilities
To estimate Eve’s information (Fig. 2) we assume that the delay between two of Bob’s signal time slots and also
between Eve’s blinding pulse and the preceding signal pulse is greater then the average dead time of the SPADs,
which itself is longer than a signal time slot. We will further assume the recovery process to be binary (on or off)
with a certain dead time and a passive basis choice setup with four detectors (see Fig. 1). Active switching systems
with two detectors can be analyzed accordingly.
We first calculate the detection probabilities of blinding pulses (coming from Eve) and signal pulses (emitted by
Alice). We start with the blinding pulses. Let Pp(µ
eff
B ) and Pd(µ
eff
B ) be the probability that a blinding pulse is
recognized in the detector analyzing parallel and diagonal polarization relative to the blinding pulse polarization, re-
spectively. The corresponding detection probability in the orthogonal orientation is negligible. Detection probabilities
depend on the blinding pulse intensity expressed as the mean photon number per pulse µeffB coupled into the (ideal)
quantum channel. Here we include the coupling efficiency from Eve to Bob.
The probabilities of registering detections in one, two or three of the respective detectors at the same time then
are:
pp(µ
eff
B ) = Pp(µ
eff
B )︸ ︷︷ ︸
parallel detector clicks
· (1− Pd(µeffB ))(1− Pd(µeffB ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
both diagonal detectors do not click
(A.1)
pd(µ
eff
B ) = Pd(µ
eff
B ) · (1− Pp(µeffB ))(1− Pd(µeffB )) (2×) (A.2)
ppd(µ
eff
B ) = Pp(µ
eff
B ) · Pd(µeffB ) · (1− Pd(µeffB )) (2×) (A.3)
pdd(µ
eff
B ) = P
2
d (µ
eff
B ) · (1− Pp(µeffB )) (A.4)
ppdd(µ
eff
B ) = Pp(µ
eff
B ) · P 2d (µeffB ) (A.5)
So the probabilities that none, one, two or three detectors fire due to a blinding pulse are (Fig. 2):
p(0)(µ
eff
B ) = (1− Pp(µeffB )) · (1− Pd(µeffB ))2 (A.6)
p(1)(µ
eff
B ) = pp(µ
eff
B ) + 2pd(µ
eff
B ) (A.7)
p(2)(µ
eff
B ) = 2ppd(µ
eff
B ) + pdd(µ
eff
B ) (A.8)
p(3)(µ
eff
B ) = ppdd(µ
eff
B ) (A.9)
Signal pulse detection probabilities
Using the previous results, the probability that a detector registers a signal pulse, depending on the detector’s
polarization φ and the signal pulse’s polarization θ with respect to the blinding pulse can be calculated giving
pSθ,φ(µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S ) = (1− Pφ(µeffB ))PSθ (µeffS ) , (A.10)
with φ, θ ∈ {p, d, o} meaning parallel, diagonal and orthogonal and Po(µeffB ) = 0 and the signal pulse mean photon
number at the receiver µeffS := ηSµS with mean photon number at the (signal) source µS and coupling efficiency from
Alice to Bob ηS .
From this, the amount of information an adversary can gain from such an attack can be estimated: The difference
between the maximum (= 1) and the current value of the binary entropy is used as the information gain a potential
eavesdropper would have:
I = 1−H2(p(xEve = xBob)) (A.11)
= 1 + Pr(xEve = xBob) log(Pr(xEve = xBob)) + Pr(xEve 6= xBob) log(Pr(xEve 6= xBob)) (A.12)
6With
p‖(µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S ) := p
S
p,p(µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S ) + p
S
d,d(µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S ) and (A.13)
p⊥(µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S ) := p
S
o,o(µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S ) + p
S
d,d(µ
eff
B , µ
eff
S ) (A.14)
it is intuitively clear that for large µeffB , i.e. high blinding intensities, all the terms with p
S
d,d and p
S
p,p will become
small, because most of the time all detectors but the one orthogonal to the blinding pulse will be inactive.
Now the information gain (A.12) can be calculated to give:
I(µeffB , µ
eff
S ) = 1 +
p‖
p‖ + p⊥
log2
(
p‖
p‖ + p⊥
)
+
p⊥
p‖ + p⊥
log2
(
p⊥
p‖ + p⊥
)
(A.15)
In the simulation (Fig. 2) it is assumed that the photon statistics of signal and blinding pulses in a four SPAD
receiver (Fig. 1) are Poissonian and thus Pp(µ
eff
B ) = 1− e−
µ
eff
B
2 , Pd(µ
eff
B ) = 1− e−
µ
eff
B
4 , PSp (µ
eff
S ) = 1− e−
µ
eff
S
2 and
PSd (µ
eff
S ) = 1− e−
µ
eff
S
4 .
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